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This study is an empirical investigation of theoretical predictions concerning the impact of 
bank competition on bank risk and asset allocations. Recent work (Boyd, De Nicolò and Jalal, 
2009, BDNJ henceforth) predicts that as competition in banking increases, the loan-to-asset 
ratio will rise (under reasonable assumptions), but the probability of bank failure can either 
increase or decrease. However, the probability of bank failure will fall if and only if 
borrowers’ response to take on less risk as loan rates decline is sufficiently strong. We test 
these predictions using two samples with radically different attributes. With both, we find that 
banks’ probability of failure is negatively and significantly related to measures of 
competition. We also find that as competition intensifies, borrower risk decreases and the 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
This empirical study investigates the relationship between bank competition, asset 
allocations and risk taking.  It presents a sequence of tests of the predictions of the model 
recently developed in Boyd, De Nicolò and Jalal (2009, BDNJ henceforth). The BDNJ model 
allows for imperfect deposit and loan market competition, but adds banks’ holding of a risk-free 
asset, which is not done in any existing theoretic literature.  
The relationship between bank competition, asset allocation and bank risk is of great 
interest to policy-makers.  One of the key economic contributions of banks is their role in 
efficiently intermediating between borrowers and lenders in the sense of Diamond (1984) or 
Boyd and Prescott (1986). But banks play no such role when they raise deposit funds and use 
them to acquire riskless assets.  Thus, if competition affects banks’ choices between loans and 
riskless assets, there will be welfare consequences.    
The BDNJ model predicts that as competition in banking increases, under reasonable 
assumptions the loan-to-asset ratio will rise, but the probability of bank failure can either 
increase or decrease (unlike in Boyd, De Nicolo (2005).  However, the BDNJ model reveals an 
important conditional relationship between bank risk and borrower risk. As competition 
intensifies, banks lower loan rates and borrowers respond by lowering their own risk of failure 
ceteris paribus (which has come to be known as the “BDN effect” in the literature).  However, 
bank risk will fall if and only if borrower risk decreases sufficiently. In other words, bank risk 
will decrease if and only if the BDN effect is sufficiently strong.  
We explore these predictions using two datasets: a cross-section of 2,500 U.S. banks in 
2003, and an international panel dataset with annual individual bank observations of about 100 
non-industrialized countries for the period 1993-2004. As will be explained, the two samples   
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have very different attributes.  One is chosen for its precision in measurement of competition,   
the other for its large size, breadth and variety of coverage.  
We begin with a review of the recent literature, a literature that has grown substantially 
since the publication of Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) prompted new interest in this topic.  We 
then turn to the empirical tests.   There are three main findings. First, banks’ probability of 
failure is positively and significantly related to concentration.
1  Second, banks’ loan-to-asset 
ratios are negatively and significantly associated with measures of concentration. This is 
consistent with the predictions of the BDNJ model when the interest rate elasticity of loan 
demand is greater (in absolute value) than the interest rate elasticity of deposit supply. To our 
knowledge, we are the first to empirically investigate the link between competitive conditions 
and bank asset allocations.  As noted, this finding is important for policy because, as will be 
discussed, it represents another social benefit of competition in banking.  Both the first and 
second findings are robustly supported by a variety of specifications with both datasets.  
The third empirical finding is that when concentration increases, the risk of borrowers 
increases also. This finding is consistent with the joint-conditional relationship between bank 
risk of failure and borrower risk of default predicted by the BDNJ model. To test this joint-
conditional relationship we employ several loan loss variables as proxy measures for the 
probability of loan customers’ default.  In all tests and with both samples, as competition 
intensifies banks’ loan loss ratios deteriorate. Previous empirical work has investigated both 
bank risk and borrower risk separately, but often the joint-conditional relationship between the 
two has been ignored.  
                                                 
1 Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) predict that when concentration increases bank risk of failure will increase.     
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        The remainder of the paper is composed of four sections.  Section II reviews the 
literature. Section III present the evidence on the relationship between measures of competition 
and bank risk, while Section IV focuses on such a relationship using measures of borrowers’ 
risk.. Section V concludes.    
 
II.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
A.   Existing Empirical Evidence   
In this section, we review the recent empirical literature on competition and risk in 
banking (One can also find useful literature reviews in Beck (2008), and Noth, (2010)).  As 
reported by Beck op. cit., this literature has produced mixed results:  “Empirical studies focusing 
on individual countries provide ….. ambiguous results, while cross-country studies point mostly 
to a positive relationship between competition and stability in the banking system.” (Abstract).    
 There are two broad classes of risk measures and existing research has examined both:  
the riskiness of banks and the riskiness of bank loan customers (the latter usually being proxied 
by loan loss measures).  Some studies have treated loan loss ratios as actual proxies for bank risk 
of failure (For examples, Dick, 2006; Jimenez et al., 2010). However, such measures actually 
represent borrower rather than bank risk, since they reflect the fraction of loan customers in (or 
expected to be in) default. Borrower risk and bank risk are different objects and can move in 
opposite directions – for example, due to offsetting changes in bank equity ratios.  In terms of the 
relation between bank competition and bank risk, such tests are inconclusive.  
Jimenez et. al. (2010) and Berger et. al. (2009) find that as competition increases bank 
risk of failure increases also, which is the opposite of what we obtain in this study. However, 
both studies employ several different measures of competition, including the Lerner Index, and 
empirical approaches that we will critically discuss below.  Berger et. al. (op. cit.) employ a   
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sample composed of large, developed nations, and define a country as a banking market when 
using concentration measures. However, this sample includes many large multinational banks 
that operate across national borders and therefore blur market definitions.  For just that reason, in 
our work we will intentionally exclude the countries that Berger et. al. (op. cit.)  studied.       
Three recent studies use our theoretical framework (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005, and 
BDNJ) to impose discipline on their empirics. Cerqueiro (2008), working with highly 
disaggregated data, investigates the link between banking competition and loan customer risk.  
He studies the attributes of both bank loans extended, and of the pool of applicants from which 
loan customers are drawn.  He finds robust evidence that more concentration is associated with 
significantly higher loan rates.  In turn, higher loan rates are associated with a lower quality 
applicant pool and lower quality loans extended. These results clearly indicate endogenous loan 
customer reaction to the degree of competition in banking (e.g. a BDN effect).  This could reflect 
a moral hazard or adverse selection problem, but either will cause loan risk to decline as bank 
competition intensifies.  Noth (2010) also employs highly disaggregated data and studies the risk 
of bank borrowers.  He finds a nonlinear relationship such that as banking competition increases, 
borrowers risk first increases and then declines.  
Another recent study is Corbea and D’Erasmo (2009).  This study is a stochastic-dynamic 
calibration and simulation of a banking industry that competes a la Cournot-Nash. It is 
potentially important because it employs a methodology totally different from other existing 
work in this literature.  Early calibrations of their model suggest that increasing competition in 
banking reduces the risk of bank failure, consistent with our own findings.         
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B.   Measuring Competition in Banking: Conceptual Issues   
There have been two important problems in the way that many existing empirical studies 
measure the degree of competition in banking markets. The measures of competition have often 
been  ad-hoc  as they  have lacked rigorous theoretical underpinnings. Most importantly, as 
stressed by De Nicolò and Turk Ariss (2010), these measures have been constructed ignoring 
risk and uncertainty.  
Several studies have employed the so-called “H-statistic” introduced by Panzar and 
Rosse (1987). One problem is due to using the H-statistic as a continuous measure of competitive 
conditions.  It is well known that using this statistic as a continuous measure of competition is 
inappropriate, and may produce competitive rankings opposite to those obtained by other 
measures (see the discussion in Shaffer, 2004). An additional problem of this measure is that it is 
derived under the assumption of competitive factor markets. As applied to banking, this 
assumption has been applied to banks’ liability side, with the implication that market power rents 
on the funding side are ignored. Studies using the H-statistic as a continuous measure of 
competition and ignoring risk and uncertainty include Bikker and Haaf (2002) Claessens and 
Laeven (2004, 2005), and Levy-Yeyati and Micco (2007).
2 
Several other studies have employed some proxy measure of a Lerner index as a measure 
of competition. However, as demonstrated by Vives (2008), measures such as the Lerner index 
are not model-independent, so that “….. it cannot be taken for granted that a good proxy for the 
degree of product substitutability, as an indicator of competitive pressure, is the Lerner index” 
                                                 
2 More recently, Shaeck and Cihak (2010) employ an H-type measure of competition and show that this measure 
exhibits a continuous “ranking” of competition similar to the H measure. Thus, the problems associated with H-type 
measures persist also in this study. In addition, as in the other studies reviewed, their competition measure ignores 
rents on the funding side as well as risk and uncertainty.    
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(Vives, 2008, p.445). Thus, the results obtained using such measures of competition are difficult 
to evaluate and compare without a specific reference to a model. 
3 
Examples of such studies include Jimenez et al. (2010) and Berger et al. (2009). Jimenez 
et al. (2010) make an attempt to “correct” their Lerner index with a default risk premium 
obtained under the assumption that the cost of bank funding is determined competitively; thus, 
their risk-correction ignores market power rents on the liability side. In addition, this premium is 
proxied by the probability of default of their loan categories, given by the ratio of defaulted loans 
to total loans. Their dependent variable is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. Thus, 
the dependent variable is regressed on a highly correlated independent variable (to give a 
perspective, during 1991Q1-2008Q3 the correlation between delinquencies and charge off rates 
on all loans for the US commercial banks was 0.86). In addition to concentration measures,  
Berger et. al. (2009) employ a Lerner index in which marginal costs are estimated assuming that 
bank funding is provided competitively. Therefore, such a measure ignores market power on the 
liability side and does not take into account borrower default risk    
C.   Our Empirical Work:  Its Relation to the Literature 
Our analysis differs from previous studies in three key respects. First, this is the first 
empirical study in banking that assesses the joint implications of changes in competitive 
conditions on bank risk and on asset allocations. Second, we employ measures of bank 
competition and risk that are dictated by and derived formally from an explicit theoretical 
construct, the BDNJ model.  Third, we separately examine bank risk of failure and borrower risk 
of failure, mindful of the theoretical link between the two. 
                                                 
3 This same point is stressed by Corts (1998).   
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The relationship between bank competition and asset allocations is important, and to our 
knowledge has received no previous attention in this literature.  The BDNJ model suggests that 
competition will affect the loan-asset ratio and we believe that policy makers should care about 
that.  Suppose, (hypothetically and, based on our work, counter-factually) that reduced 
competition resulted in reduced risk of bank failure, but only because it caused banks to 
substitute risk-free government bonds for risky loans. Assume further that this supposed benefit 
of reduced competition was correctly identified by the researcher and reported to the policy-
maker.   The policy-maker would be poorly guided unless the researcher also investigated asset 
allocations.  Without interfering with competition, the regulator could achieve the same desired 
risk effect by directly requiring banks to hold a higher-than-equilibrium fraction of risk-free 
assets. 
 
III.   EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND PROCEDURES  
  
A.    Measurement of competition 
A standard measure of market structure is the Hirschmann-Hirfendahl Index (HHI).
  In 
symmetric Cournot-Nash models, such as the BDNJ model, the HHI index is given by
2 N
 . 
Ceteris paribus, this HHI is positively associated with the price-cost margin (Lerner index). 
However, in reality both banks and markets are heterogeneous. Thus, the relationship between 
concentration measures and the degree of competition needs to be conditional on certain factors   
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that are not directly connected with the ability of firms to extract market power rents, but may 
affect the level of concentration.
4    
Banks differ both with respect to scale (dis)economies and with respect to their cost 
structures. In theory, it has been well known since Desmetz (1973) that, ceteris paribus, a high 
HHI may reflect differences in banks’ technologies, since more efficient banks will be able to 
gain larger market shares due to their ability to set lower prices.  
Likewise, markets differ with respect to size and the demand for banking services. 
Comparing HHIs across markets requires that we take into account differences in market size 
(see Bresnahan, 1989), since an HHI may be lower in a larger market, in which a greater number 
of firms can profitably operate. Differences in the demand for banking services across markets 
can also result in differences in HHIs not necessarily directly related to the ability of banks to 
extract market power rents.     
Our proxy measure of the degree of competition is the HHI index conditional on 
measures of banks’ size and costs, size of market, and proxy measures of the demand for banking 
services.  As remarked by Sutton (2007) with reference to studies of non-financial firms in which 
firm and market heterogeneity is accounted for, “…..that a fall in concentration will lead to a fall 
in prices and price-cost margins is well-supported both theoretically and empirically.”  Similarly, 
Degryse and Ongena (2008), in their recent comprehensive survey of the empirical banking 
literature, show that the results of studies conducted in many countries and time periods indicate 
that more concentrated markets are associated with significant interest rate margins in both 
deposit and loan markets.    
                                                 
4 It is well known that in the context of Cournot-Nash competition the direct relationship between concentration and 
the degree of market power holds only for specific forms of firm heterogeneity (see for example Tirole, 1988).  
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B.   Measurement of risk 
Our first empirical measure of bank risk is the Z-score,  which is defined as
() / ( ) Z ROA EA ROA   , where ROA is the rate of return on assets, EA is the ratio of equity 
to assets, and  () ROA   is an estimate of the standard deviation of the rate of return on assets, all 
measured with accounting data. This risk measure is monotonically associated with a bank’s 
probability of failure and has been widely used in the empirical banking and finance literature.  It 
represents the number of standard deviations below the mean by which a bank’s profits would 
have to fall so as to deplete equity capital.  It does not require that profits be normally distributed 
to be a valid probability measure; indeed, all it requires is existence of the first four moments of 
the return distribution (Roy, 1952).
5   
Our second risk measure is specifically related to the riskiness of banks’ loan portfolios.  
Although explicit borrower default probability measures are not available, we can employ 
standard measures of loan portfolio losses as proxy measures.   
C.   Samples 
We employ two samples with very different characteristics. The first sample, a single 
cross-section of US banks, is chosen so as to minimize measurement problems in market 
definition. In making this choice we give up sample size and representativeness.  The second 
sample, an international panel of banks, has enormous size and is representative of many 
                                                 
5 In the BDNJ model banks are for simplicity assumed to operate without equity capital.  However, in the model the 
definition of a bank failure is when gross profits are insufficient to pay depositors.   If there were equity capital in 
the model, bankruptcy would occur precisely when equity capital was depleted.  Thus, the empirical risk measure is 
identical to the theoretical risk measure, augmented to reflect the reality that banks hold equity.     
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different markets and economic environments.  However, measurement issues arise in defining 
banking markets and measuring competition therein.    
The first sample is composed of 2500 U.S. banks that operated only in rural non-
Metropolitan Statistical Areas, and is a cross-section for one period, June, 2003. The banks in 
this sample tend to be small and the mean (median) sample asset size is $80.8 million ($50.2 
million). They exhibit extreme variation in competitive conditions.
6 By limiting ourselves to 
these banks we are able to use the Federal Reserve’s “Facilities” dataset.   For anti-trust 
purposes, in these rural market areas the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) defines a competitive 
market as a county and maintains deposit HHIs for each market.    These computations are done 
at a high level of disaggregation. Within each market the FRB defines a competitor as a “banking 
facility,” which could be a bank or a bank branch.      
There is a substantial literature on the topic of competition in rural US banking markets, 
one that is too large to be adequately reviewed here.
7   However, two measurement problems are 
commonly recognized in this research.  One is that the FRB only reports HHI indices for 
deposits, not for loans.   It is entirely possible that the loan market is different from the deposit 
market in many cases so that the deposit market HHI is not the appropriate measure for loan 
market conditions.  Another recognized problem is that many banks operate in more than one 
deposit and/or loan market.  When that occurs, the researcher must somehow aggregate HHI 
measures across markets and there is no unanimity on how that should be done.  A related 
problem, important for our purposes, is that banks do not publicly report balance sheets at the 
                                                 
6 For example, when sorted by HHI, the top sample decile has a median HHI of  5733 while the bottom decile has a 
median  HHI of  1244. The sample includes 32 monopoly banking markets.   
7 Some useful studies include Adams et al .(2007), Rosen (2007), Berger, Rosen and Udell (2007),  and Hannan and 
Prager (2004, 2006).     
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branch level.  This means that we cannot compute the loan/asset ratio at the county level, and 
that is a key variable for our investigation.  
 In an attempt to mitigate all these problems simultaneously, we asked FRB staff to delete 
from our sample all banks that operated in more than one deposit market.
8  By limiting our 
sample to such “unit banks,” we neatly avoid the problem of having to aggregate HHI indices.  
In addition, with these unit banks we are able to match up competitive market conditions as 
represented by deposit HHIs and loan/asset ratios as represented by bank balance sheet data. 
9   
Obviously, computation of the HHI statistics was done before these deletions, and was based on 
all competitors (banks and branches) in each market. Finally, this dataset allows us to include (or 
not) savings and loans as competitors with banks, which provides a useful robustness test.  S&L 
deposits are near perfect substitutes for bank deposits, whereas S&Ls compete with banks for 
some classes of loans and not for others.  
The second sample is an unbalanced panel data set of about 3,000 banks in about 100 
countries excluding major developed countries over the period 1993 to 2004, which is from the 
Bankscope  (Fitch-IBCA)  database. We considered all commercial banks (unconsolidated 
accounts) for which data are available. The sample is thus unaffected by selection bias, as it 
includes all banks operating in each period, including those which exited either because they 
were absorbed by other banks or because they were closed.
10  The number of bank-year 
                                                 
8 The “banking facilities” data set is quite different from the Call Reports which take a bank as the unit of 
observation. These data are not user-friendly and we thank Allen Berger and Ron Jawarcziski for their great 
assistance in assembling these data.   
9These “unit banks” have offices in only one county; however, they may still lend or raise deposits outside that 
county.  To the extent that they do, our method for linking deposit market competition and asset portfolio allocations 
will still be noisy.        
10 Coverage of the Bankscope database is incomplete in some countries for the earlier years (1993 and 1994), but 
from 1995 coverage in almost all countries is about 95 percent of all banking systems’ assets. Therefore, time 
(continued)   
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observations ranges from about 10,000 to 13,000, depending on availability of all variables of 
interest.   
The advantage of this international data set is its size, panel dimension, and the fact that it 
includes a great variety of banking systems and economic conditions. The disadvantage is that 
bank market definitions are necessarily imprecise, since it is assumed that the market for each 
bank is defined by its home nation.  Thus, the market structure for a bank in a country is 
represented by an HHI for that country.  To reduce possible measurement error from this source, 
we exclude banks from the U.S., the European Union, Switzerland, the Nordic countries, and 
Japan.  In these cases, defining the nation as a market is especially problematic, both because of 
the country’s economic size and because of the presence of many international banks.
11 
 
D.   Results for the U.S. Sample  
Table 1 defines all variables and sample statistics. Here, the Z-score, 
() / ( ) Z ROA EA ROA   ), is constructed setting EA equal to the ratio of the quarterly average 
over three years of the book value of equity over total assets;  ROA equal to the ratio of net 
accounting profits after taxes to total assets; and  () ROA   equal to the quarterly standard 
deviation of the rate of return on assets computed over the 12 most recent quarters.  As shown in 
Table 1, the mean Z-score is quite high at about 36, reflecting the fact that the sample period was 
one of profitable and stable operations for U.S. banks. The average deposit HHI is 2856 if 
                                                                                                                                                             
variations in statistics such as concentration measures for each country essentially reflect changes in market 
structure rather than changes in sample coverage. Data for 2004 are limited to those available at the extraction time. 
11 All variables in the Bankscope database were carefully checked for reliability and consistency: outliers due to 
obvious measurement errors were eliminated, and each variable was winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles.       
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savings and loans are not included, and 2655 if they are.
12   Forty six of the fifty states are 
represented.   
We estimate versions of the following cross-sectional regression: 
  ij j j ij ij X HHI Y Z            (1) 
where  ij X  is  Z-score, the Z-score components, or the loan-to-asset ratio of bank i in county j, 
j HHI  is a deposit HHI in county j,  j Y  is a vector of county-specific controls, and  ij Z  a vector of 
bank-specific controls.    
  The control variable for bank size is the natural logarithm of total bank assets, LASSET.  
Differences in technical efficiency across banks are accounted for by the ratio of non-interest 
operating costs to total income, CTI. Our control variable for economic size of market is the 
product of median per capita county income and population, TOTALY, which is a measure of 
total household income in county.    
Differences in demand for bank services across markets are controlled by three variables 
computed at the county level: the percentage growth rate in the labor force, LABGRO; the 
unemployment rate, UNEM; and an indicator of agricultural intensity, FARM, which is the ratio 
of rural farm population to total population.  This variable is included because many of the 
counties in our sample are primarily agricultural but others are not.  To further control for 
regional variations in economic conditions all regressions include state fixed effects. Finally, 
                                                 
12 To put these HHI’s in perspective, suppose that a market had four equal sized banks.  Then its HHI would be 4 x 
25 ** 2 = 2500.      
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since the range of the ratio of loans to assets is the unit interval, we use a Cox transformation to 
turn this into an unbounded variable.
13  
In Table 2 we present regressions in which the dependent variables are the Z-score, the 
transformed ratio of loans to assets, and the three individual components of Z-score.   2.1 is a 
regression of Z-score against HHI0, the six control variables and state fixed effects (fixed effects, 
for brevity, are not shown). The coefficient of HHI0 is negative and statistically significant at 
usual or higher confidence levels.  The same is true when HHI100 is employed instead of HHI0 
(results with HHI100 are shown in the last row).  Among the control variables, the coefficient of 
CTI is negative and highly significant, suggesting that cost efficiency may reduce the risk of 
failure. The coefficient of LASSET  enters with a negative and highly significant coefficient 
suggesting that for this sample and time period larger banks were riskier than smaller ones.  
Regression 2.2 is identical to 2.1 except that it employs clustering at the county level, there being 
1280 counties included.  This procedure seems to have little effect on estimated standard errors.  
It is possible that bank failure risk, as represented by the Z-score, could  feed back and at 
least partially determine the number and size of competitors in a market as represented by the 
HHI.  This would result in a reverse-causality or “endogeneity” problem.   Therefore, column 2.3 
employs an IV procedure to instrument for HHI0. The instruments used in first stage estimates 
are median county income in 1989 and rate of poverty in 1989. These are lagged by fourteen 
years and thus should be sufficiently exogenous to current conditions in banking markets (see 
Table 2, footnote).  The IV procedure seems to have little effect on regression results except to 
marginally increase the significance of the HHI.    
                                                 
13 The Cox transformation forx is  (/ ( 1 ) ) ln x x  .  Throughout, variables transformed in this way are labeled 
“x_cox.”     
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Actually, for purely economic reasons we believe that possible endogeneity of the HHI is 
not a serious issue in the context of our application.  Our Z-scores are based on current 
accounting reports and can change very substantially in a short time frame.  The HHI, on the 
other hand, tends to change very slowly. Entry, exit, mergers and acquisitions do occur in 
banking to be sure, but at a much lower frequency.
14  Thus, for present purposes, an HHI 
measure may be considered “de-facto exogenous”. We will demonstrate that this is the case in 
results to be presented later, that exploit the time dimension of the international panel data. 
 Recall that the BDNJ model does not yield unequivocal predictions on the unconditional 
relationship between competition and bank risk. Therefore, we wish to assess whether there is 
any evidence of non-linearity in this relationship.
15  This finding is reported in column 2.4: there 
is no evidence of non-linearity.   
 Regression  2.5 shows that the (log-transformed) ratio of loans to assets is negatively and 
significantly related to both HHI measures at about the one percent confidence level. The loan to 
asset ratio is positively and significant related to the size of the market TOTALLY, and to bank 
size LASSET; it is negatively and significantly related to bank operating costs CTI.  Regression 
2.4  adds the county clustering procedure, but this seems to have little effect on confidence 
intervals. 
  In Regressions 2.7 – 2.9, the three components of the Z-score are treated as separate 
dependent variables.  PA, the rate of return on assets, is positively related to both HHI0 and 
HHI00 at about the 90% confidence level.  EA_cox is the (Cox transformation of) the equity to 
                                                 
14 For example, Berger  and Dick (2007) show that for a large sample of US banks, the best single predictor of 
market share in 2002 is  market share in  1972, thirty years earlier.     
15 Noth (2010) reports finding a non-linear variable, although with a rather different specification than ours .     
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assets ratio; this variable is not significantly related to either HHI0 or  HHI00.   lnSDPA is (the 
log-transformed) standard deviation of earnings and is positively and significantly related to both 
HHI measures. The positive sign on PA suggests that higher concentration is associated with 
higher expected profits.  However, as HHI changes the positive effect on PA is more than offset 
by the effect on lnSDPA.
16  
To summarize, results with the U.S. sample suggest that more competitive bank markets 
are associated with lower risk of bank failure and higher loan to asset ratios.  Both findings seem 
robust and are both are consistent with the predictions of the BDNJ model.
17   
 
E.   Results for the International Sample 
Table 3 reports definitions of variables and some sample statistics for banks and 
macroeconomic variables.  There is a wide variation across countries in terms of income per 
capita at PPP (ranging from US$ 440 to US$ 21,460), and in terms of bank size.   
Here, the Z-score in each year is defined as  () / ( ) tt t t Z ROA EA ROA    .  t ROA  is the 
return on average assets,  t EA  is the equity-to-assets ratio, and 
1 () | | tt t t ROA ROA T ROA 
   . 
All are constructed with annual data. When this standard deviation measure is averaged across 
                                                 
16 Recall that the models with uncertainty and endogenous choice of risk by Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) and BDNJ 
do not imply an unequivocal relationship between concentration and bank risk, since lower concentration will move 
up the probability of project success, while market power rents will be lower. The net effect will depend on the 
relative strength of the BDN effect and the magnitude of the decline in market power rents.    
17 There is a branch of the literature on bank competition in the United States that deserves mention because it is 
consistent with our finding that more competition is associated with greater banking stability. Carlson and Mitchener 
(2006) find that increased competition brought about by branch banking increased financial stability during the 
Great Depression.  A similar conclusion was reached by Jayaratne and Strahan (1996, 1998) who studied the effect 
of bank deregulation in the 1980’s and 1990’s. In all this work, cross-sectional and inter-temporal variations in 
measures of bank competition are primarily due to variations in regulatory restrictions on the location of banks and 
branches.  As banks were permitted to expand geographically, this directly affected their ability to diversify.   
Therefore, it is difficult to separate the effects of improved diversification and increased competition.  In our 
analysis, of course, regulatory restrictions of this nature play no direct role.         
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time, it generates a cross-sectional series whose correlation with the Z-score as computed 
previously is 0.89.  The median Z-score is about 19.  It exhibits a wide range, indicating the 
presence of banks that either failed (negative Z) or were close to failure (values of Z close to 0), 
and banks with minimal variations in their earnings, with very large Z values. We computed HHI 
measures based on total assets. The median HHI is about 1900, and ranges from 391 to the 
monopoly value of 10,000.  
We estimate dynamic panel regressions of the following form: 
  11 1 1 ijt i jt jt ijt ijt ijt XH H I Y Z X             ,     (2) 
where  ij X  is the Z-score,  the (transformed)  loan-to-asset ratio of bank i in country j, or the 
components of the Z-score,  i   is a time-invariant firm fixed effect,  j HHI  is a Hirschmann-
Herfindahl Index in country  j,  j Y  is a vector of country-specific controls, and  ij Z  a vector of 
bank-specific controls.   
We use a dynamic specification since the dependent variables exhibit high persistence: 
indeed, the coefficient   is different from 0 with high significance in all regressions presented 
below. For this reason, the “static” specifications used in all studies using panel data previously 
reviewed (except Jimenez et al., 2010) may lead to significant estimation biases.  
Importantly, the HHI, the macro variables and bank specific variables are all lagged one 
year so as to capture variations in the dependent variable as a function of pre-determined past 
values of the independent variables. This is a standard specification (see, for example, Demsetz 
and Strahan, 1997). Economically, our specification is consistent with the fact (and standard 
modeling assumptions) that banks’ risk and asset allocation choices made in period t will 
generate observable outcomes in period t+1. Statistically, this specification exploits the time   
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dimension to address the potential problem of endogeneity of measures of competition that might 
arise from contemporaneous specifications.     
   The vector of country-specific variables  jt Y  includes: real GDP growth and inflation, 
which control for cross-country differences in the economic environment; GDP per capita and 
the logarithm of population, which control for differences in relative and absolute size of markets 
(countries); and the exchange rate of domestic currency to the US dollar, since bank balance 
sheet values are all expressed in dollar terms. For the reasons mentioned earlier, the vector of 
firm variables  ij Z  includes the natural logarithm of total bank assets, LASSET, and the ratio of 
non-interest operating costs to total income CTI to control for differences in banks’ technologies 
and cost structures.  
We estimated (2) applying the GMM estimation procedure developed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991). The lagged dependent variables and all independent variables are instrumented 
using their lags at time t-2, t-3, and so on.  Estimates of coefficients are reported for the one-step 
Arellano-Bond estimator, while, as suggested by Arellano and Bond (op. cit.), autocorrelation 
tests and Sargan specification tests are based on the relevant two-step estimator.  
Table 4 reports the results for the entire sample.
18 For both the Z-score (regression 4.1) 
and the (Cox-transformed) ratio of loans to assets (regression 4.2), the sign associated with the 
HHI is negative and significant. Note that for both these regressions, the autocorrelation tests 
indicate that coefficient estimates are unbiased and the Sargan tests do not reject the null 
hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid.  
                                                 
18 As pointed out in footnote 11, the incompleteness of the coverage of the Bankscope database for the years 1993-
1995 and 2004 may induce bias in the estimates of HHIs.  For this reason, we run all regressions for the international 
sample reported below excluding these years, and obtained essentially identical results. For brevity, the results of 
these regressions are omitted.   
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Regressions 4.3-4.5 report results with the components of Z-score as dependent variables. 
The return on assets (ROA) is negatively related to HHI, the (Cox-transformed) ratio of equity 
capital to assets (EA_cox) is also negatively related to HHI, while the (log-transformed) volatility 
of earnings LnSDROA is positively related to the HHI.  All coefficients are significant at standard 
confidence levels. Thus, in this international sample all components of the Z-score move in a 
direction consistent with the negative and significant coefficient that we obtain when Z-score is 
the dependent variable.   
Next, we address two “robustness” issues. First, recall that the BDNJ model does not 
yield unequivocal predictions on the unconditional relationship between competition and bank 
risk. Therefore, we wish to assess whether there is any evidence of non-linearity in this 
relationship. Second, as remarked previously, we wish to assess whether changes in the 
determinants of HHI are slower than changes in the Z-score. An implication of these differential 
speeds of adjustment is that a bank’s Z-score should not predict a bank’s market share or, 
equivalently, a convex function of its market share. In fact, the HHI is the sum of squared market 
shares.   
Table 5 reports these robustness tests. As shown in regressions 5.1 and 5.2, there is no 
evidence of non-linearity both in the case of a quadratic specification, as well as in the case of a 
piecewise specification. As shown in regression 5.3, lagged Z-scores have no predictive value for 
the evolution of the square of market shares. Both these tests appear to confirm the robustness of 
our results.       
In sum, similarly to the U.S. sample, we find that more concentrated bank markets are 
ceteris paribus associated with higher risk of bank failure and lower loan-to-asset ratios.  These 
results are consistent with the predictions of the BDNJ model.   
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IV.    MEASURES OF BORROWER RISK   
 
Borrower failure and bank failure are different objects, as the probability of bank failure 
can increase (decrease) at the same time that the probability of borrower failure decreases 
(increases).  For our purposes, however, indicators of loan quality have independent interest 
since they should be highly correlated with the probability of borrower default.   
We have presented empirical evidence that, as competition increases, risk of bank failure 
decreases.  The BDNJ model requires that a necessary condition for such a relationship is that 
there exists a sufficiently strong BDN effect. Therefore, given our empirical results with bank 
risk of failure, it is important to test if increasing competition also reduces borrower risk of 
failure.  This is, essentially, a test of the consistency between the theoretical predictions and 
empirical findings.  
A.   Results for the U.S. Sample 
For the U.S. sample, we use two measures of loan losses, both of which have been used 
in the literature.  One is “loan loss provisions” LLM1, which is an expense item and reflects 
managerial judgment concerning future loan loss write-offs.   The other is the “loan loss 
allowance” LLM2, which summarizes historical loan loss experience.  Both variables are scaled 
by net loans and leases.   Results with both variables in levels and log-transformed levels, are 
presented in Table 6., where the first four columns show results with LLM1 , and the second four 
columns with LLM2. We include all the controls discussed previously. In 6.1, 6.2, 6..4 and 6.5, 
the coefficient of the HHI index is positive and significant at usual confidence levels. These 
results suggest that there is a sufficiently strong BDN effect in our sample of unit banks in the 
United States.   Columns 6.3-6.4 and 6.6-6.7 look for evidence of a non-linear relationship and 
find none.     
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B.   Results for the International Sample 
With the international data, we also use two measures widely used in the literature: “loan 
loss provisions”, LLP, and “impaired (non-performing) loans”, NPL, measuring loans that are 
delinquent for more than 60 or 90 days.  Here, both variables are scaled by gross loans.    
Table 7 reports the results with both variables in levels and log-transformed levels, with 
linear and quadratic specifications for the HHI, and all the controls discussed previously 
included.  In the linear specifications 7.1, 7.3, 7.5 and 7.7 : the coefficient of the HHI index is not 
significant, except in 7.5, where it is positive and significant,  
By contrast, all quadratic specifications (7.2, 7.4, 7.6 and 7.8) exhibit a positive and 
significant coefficient of the HHI index and a negative and significant coefficient of the squared 
HHI index. Thus, the relationship between proxy measures of borrower risk and competition in 
this sample exhibits a non-linear inverted U-shape: as competition rises from low levels (high 
concentration) borrower risk first increases and then declines. As measured by the regressions in 
Table 7, the inversion of the borrower risk-competition relationship from positive to negative 
occurs at fairly high levels of concentration, since the level of HHI beyond which borrower risk 
declines includes between 90 and 95 percent of the whole sample. This result is consistent with 
the BDNJ model, which predicts that the BDN effect is likely to become stronger as competition 
intensifies. 
19  
                                                 
19  As noted, our results are exactly the opposite of what Jimenez et al (2010) find and at variance with the 
implications of the theoretical model of Martinez-Meira and Repullo (2008). Our result are also at variance with 
those obtained by Berger et al. (2009), who do not find a significant inverted U-shaped relationship. However, we 
have already remarked that our results and theirs are not necessarily comparable owing to differences in 
measurement and specifications of the empirical models used.    
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V.   CONCLUSIONS 
   We draw two main conclusions. First, our empirical work, based on two data sets and a 
variety of specifications, suggests that as banking markets become more competitive risk of bank 
failure declines.  So does the risk of bank loan customers.   Second, in all our tests the data 
suggest a positive and significant ceteris paribus relationship between bank competition and the 
loan-to-asset ratio, as predicted by the BDNJ model. This is potentially important because it adds 
a dimension that policy makers should consider when evaluating the costs and benefits of 
competition in banking.   There has been no previous work on this relation and obviously more 
work needs to be done.  If our results hold up to further examination, however, the policy 
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Table 1. U.S. Sample 
 
All balance sheet and income statement data are from the FDIC’s Call Reports which are available at the 
FDIC website. Control variables are from various sources, mostly the Census Bureau website.  All control 
variables are at the county level. 
 
Panel A.  Definition of Variables 
 
  Bank Variables  
Z-score  (rate of return on assets + ratio of  equity to assets) ÷ standard deviation of the rate 
of return on assets, quarterly data  
LA  Total loans ÷ total assets, quarterly average over 3 years 
   
   
LASSET  Natural logarithm of  bank assets 
CTI  Ratio of non-interest expense to interest income + non-interest income of banks, 
quarterly average over 3 years 
  Market structure 
HHI0  Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index computed with banks only 
HHI100  Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index computed with banks and savings and loan 
associations 
   
  County controls 
LABGRO  Percentage growth in labor force 1999 – 2003 
UNEM  Unemployment rate, 2003 
FARM  Ratio of agricultural population ÷ total population in 2003 
TOTALLY  Median income in 1999 * number of households.  $million.  
 
Panel B. Sample Statistics 
  
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
LABGRO  0.0062 0.0671  -0.2420 0.2718 
UNEM  5.8261 2.4747 1.4000  21.8000 
FARM  0.0706 0.0563 0.0000 0.4086 
LASSET  10.8132 0.8095 7.6917  16.7759 
CTI  0.4630 0.9072 0.0247  29.1276 
TOTALLY  3740.0 4100.0  611.7 6780.0 
HHI0  2855.67 1577.69  881.67  10000.00 
HHI100  2655.90 1540.73  719.65  10000.00 
Z-score  35.5870 16.7554  3.0910  261.8150 
LA  0.5715 0.1465 0.0000 0.9556 
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Table 2. U.S. Sample Regressions  
Z-score = (rate of return on assets + ratio of equity to assets) ÷ standard deviation of the rate of return on assets. LA = total loans 
÷ total assets, quarterly average over 3 years. LA_cox is the Cox transform of LA. HHI0  is the Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index 
computed with banks only. HHI100 is the Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index computed with banks and savings and loan associations. 
HHI0^2 is the squared value of HHI0.  LABGRO is the percentage growth in labor force 1999 – 2003. UNEM is the 
unemployment rate, 2003. FARM is the ratio agricultural population / total population in 2003. LASSET =  natural logarithm of  
bank assets. CTI = ratio of non-interest expense to interest income + non-interest income of banks, quarterly average over 3 
years. TOTALLY = median income in 1999 * number of households. Columns 2.1 and 2.5 are robust OLS regressions.  Columns 






Robust p values in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Footnote: The first-step regression estimate for equation 2.3 is HHI0 = 16125 (0.000***) – 1384.622 (0.000***) * 
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Table 3.  International Sample 
 
This panel data set includes bank/year observations for about 3,000+ banks in 134 countries excluding 
major developed countries over the period 1993 to 2004. 
 




Panel B.   Sample Statistics 
  
Variable  Mean Median Standard 
Deviation
Minimum  Maximum
   
Z-score  (time series)   44.2 19.1 68.73 -40.5  497.6
LA  0.47 0.48 0.22 0.05  0.92
LASSET   12.9 12.5 2.03 3.8  20.4
CTI  69.9 61.7 60.68 6.7  96.3
   
HHIA  2651 1918 2354 391  10,000
   
GDPPC  6021 5930 3727 440  21,460
GROWTH  3.85 2.97 5.79 -12.6  12.8
INFL  33.1 8.4 413.7 -11.5  527.2
 
 
Bank Variables    
Z-score(t)  Z-score,      / ttt t Z ROA EQTA ROA    
LA(t)/ LA.cox(t)  Gross loan-to-asset ratio/  (/ ( 1 ) ) tt Ln LA LA    
LASSET(t)  Log of total assets (in US $)
CTI(t)  Operating cost to income ratio
   
Market Structure   
HHIA(t)  Hirschmann-Hirfendahl  Indexes based on accounting assets  
   
Macroeconomic Variables   
GDPPC(t)  Per-capita GDP at PPP
LPOP(t)  Log Population
GROWTH(t)  Real GDP Growth
INFL(t)  Average CPI Inflation Rate 
ER(t)  Domestic currency/US$ exchange rate
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Table 4. International Sample Regressions 
 
Z-score and its components are defined as in the text. HHIA is the  asset-HHI; GDPCC is per-capita GDP at PPP; 
LPOP is Ln(Population); GROWTH is real GDP growth, INFL is the annual inflation rate; ER is the domestic 
currency/US$ exchange rate. LASSET is the log of total assets; CTI is the cost-to-income ratio. The L. prefix 
indicates the relevant variable lagged one period. Estimates are obtained by the GMM one-step estimator of 
Arellano and Bond (1991). M1 and M2 is the p-value of the Arellano Bond statistics for first and second order 
correlation of residuals respectively; Sargan test is the p-value obtained by estimates of the two-step version of the 
model. Robust p-values are reported in brackets: * denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. 
   DEPENDENT VARIABLES    
   Zscore LAcox  ROA  EAcox  lnSDROA 
4.1 4.2  4.3 4.4 4.5 
        
L.HHIA -24.868**  -0.189**  -0.866*  -0.208**  0.483*** 
[0.02] [0.03]  [0.07] [0.05] [0.01] 
L.GDPPC -0.006***  -0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
[0.00] [0.00]  [0.68] [0.00] [0.00] 
L.LPOP -15.946  -1.259***  -2.803***  0.229  1.315** 
[0.66] [0.00]  [0.01] [0.320]  [0.0151] 
L.GROWTH 0.143  0.005***  -0.034***  -0.001  -0.001 
[0.51] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.532]  [0.856] 
L.INFL -0.004  0  0  0.000**  0 
[0.38] [0.62]  [0.32]  [0.0207]  [0.208] 
L.ER 0.0002  0.001  0  0  0 
[0.78] [0.48]  [0.44] [0.599]  [0.993] 
L.LASSET -0.988  0.177***  -0.658***  0.303***  -0.03 
[0.67] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.488] 
L.CTI 0.028**  0.004  0.009***  0.001***  -0.001*** 











Constant 143.574  2.396***  18.345***  -4.873***  -5.227*** 
[0.24] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
  
Observations 8486  9615  9643  9684  9631 
Number of banks  2417  2593  2625  2633  2622 
M1 (p-value)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
M2 (p-value)  0.27  0.73  0.83  0.77  0.31 
Sargan Test (p-value)  0.39  0.43  0.38  0.06  0.02 
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Table 5.  International Sample: Two Robustness Tests 
 
Z-score and its components are defined as in the text. HHIA is the asset-HHI; HHIA2 is the square of HHIA; 
HHIAlow and HHIAhih are the HHIA lower median and higher median respectively. MSHARE2 is the square of 
the market share of a bank relative to total assets. All other variables are defined as in Table 4. Estimates are 
obtained by the GMM one-step estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991). M1 and M2 is the p-value of the Arellano 
Bond statistics for first and second order correlation of residuals respectively; Sargan test is the p-value obtained by 
estimates of the two-step version of the model. Robust p-values are reported in brackets: * denotes significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
   Zscore Zscore  MSHARE2 





L.HHIAlow -15.946  -70.777*** 
[0.66] [0.00] 
L.HHIAhigh 0.143  -33.728*** 
[0.51] [0.00]    
L.GDPPC -0.006***  -0.006***  0.004 
[0.00] [0.00]  [0.46] 
L.LPOP -15.589  -13.204  0.047 
[0.67] [0.72]  [0.17] 
L.GROWTH 0.146  0.131  0.0004 
[0.49] [0.54]  [0.64] 
L.INFL -0.004  -0.004  -0.000* 
[0.39] [0.45]  [0.07] 
L.ER 0.000  0.000  0.000 
[0.77] [0.95]  [0.97] 
L.LASSET -0.98  -1.177  -0.004** 
[0.67] [0.61]  [0.01] 
L.CTI 0.028**  0.028**  0 
[0.02] [0.02]  [0.80] 
L.Zscore  0.061*** 0.060***  0.0003 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.741] 
L.MSHARE2 0.481*** 
[0.00] 
Constant 143.217  141.322  -0.137 
[0.24] [0.25]  [0.20] 
Observations 8486  8486  9684 
Number of banks  2417  2417  2633 
M1 (p-value)  0.00  0.00  0.00 
M2 (p-value)  0.27  0.26  0.16 
Sargan Test (p-value)  0.39  0.40  0.12 
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Table 6. U.S. Sample Loan Loss Measures 
 
Dependent variables: LLM1 = Provision for loan and lease losses / Net loans and leases in June 2003; LLM2 = Loan 
loss allowance / Net loans and leases in June 2003. LLM1_cox = Ln(1 + (LLM1/(1 – LLM1))) and LLM2_cox = 
Ln(1 + (LLM2/(1 – LLM2))). Independent variables: HHI0 is the Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index computed with 
banks only. HHI100 is the Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index computed with banks and savings and loan associations. 
LASSET = natural logarithm of  bank assets. LABGRO is the percentage growth in labor force 1999 – 2003. UNEM 
is the unemployment rate, 2003. FARM is the ratio, agricultural population / total population in 2003. CTI is the  
ratio of non-interest expense to interest income + non-interest income of banks, quarterly average over 3 years. 
TOTALLY = median income in 1999 * number of households. Columns 6.1 - 6.8 are robust OLS regressions with 




LLM1 LLM1_cox LLM1 LLM1_cox LLM2 LLM2_cox LLM2 LLM2_cox
6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8
HHI0 1.98e-07**  2.04e-07**  2.91e-07 3.05e-07 8.05e-07*** 8.73e-07**  3.59e-07  3.48e-07
[0.0137] [0.0142]  [0.280] [0.280] [0.00942] [0.0113] [0.709]  [0.747]
HHI0^2 -0 -0 0  5.76e-11
[0.751] [0.741] [0.702] [0.686]
LASSET 0.000659**  0.000680**  0.000655** 0.000675** -0.00131* -0.00144*  -0.00129*  -0.00141*
[0.0165] [0.0178] [0.0200] [0.0214] [0.0655] [0.0742] [0.0754] [0.0853]
LABGRO 0.00156  0.00160  0.00159 0.00163 -0.00365 -0.00337  -0.00379  -0.00353
[0.113] [0.113] [0.122] [0.122] [0.348] [0.422] [0.335] [0.406]
UNEM   2.98e-05  2.81e-05  3.05e-05 2.88e-05 -9.73e-05 -0.000113  -0.000100  -0.000117
[0.407] [0.446] [0.401] [0.438] [0.436] [0.394] [0.433] [0.391]
FARM 4.89e-05  0.000164  0.000199 0.000327 -0.00206 -0.00351  -0.00278  -0.00436
[0.979] [0.931] [0.919] [0.873] [0.773] [0.670] [0.710] [0.610]
CTI 0.000744***  0.000749***  0.000742*** 0.000748*** -0.000249 -0.000278  -0.000242  -0.000270
[1.83e-05] [1.92e-05] [1.91e-05] [2.00e-05] [0.107] [0.110] [0.122]  [0.127]
TOTALLY -0  -0  -0 -0 -0*** -0*** -0***  -0***
[0.318] [0.321] [0.365] [0.371] [0.000980] [0.00114]  [0.00178]  [0.00214]
Constant -0.00645**  -0.00667**  -0.00658** -0.00682** 0.0305*** 0.0322***  0.0311***  0.0330***
[0.0383] [0.0396] [0.0265] [0.0280] [0.000234] [0.000638]  [0.000103]  [0.000293]
Observations 2,498  2,498  2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498  2,498
R-squared 0.032  0.030  0.032 0.030 0.025 0.023 0.026  0.023
Regressions with: 
HHI100 2.25e-07***  2.31e-07***  4.20e-07* 4.39e-07* 9.02e-07*** 9.79e-07***  3.99e-07  4.01e-07
[0.00705] [0.00738]  [0.0847] [0.0881] [0.00725] [0.00899]  [0.697]  [0.729]
HHI100^2 -0 -0 5.70e-11  6.56e-11
[0.425] [0.420] [0.683] [0.677]
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Table 7. International Sample Loan Loss Measures 
LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to gross loans, NPL is the ratio of impaired (non-performing) loans to gross loans. HHIA 
is the  asset-HHI; HHIA^2 is HHI squared. GDPCC is per-capita GDP at PPP; LPOP is Ln(Population); GROWTH is real GDP 
growth, INFL is the annual inflation rate; ER is the domestic currency/US$ exchange rate. LASSET is the log of total assets; CTI 
is the cost-to-income ratio. The L. prefix indicates the relevant variable lagged one period. Estimates are obtained by the GMM 
one-step estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991). M1 and M2 is the p-value of the Arellano Bond statistics for first and second 
order correlation of residuals respectively; Sargan test is the p-value obtained by estimates of the two-step version of the model. 
Robust p-values are reported in brackets: * denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. HHImax is the 
maximum of the quadratic terms, and the last row denotes the percentile of HHImax. 
 
 LLP LLP LLPcox LLPcox  NPL NPL NPLcox NPLcox
7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8
 
L.HHIA 0.015 0.121*** -0.115 1.416*** 4.070* 17.182** 0.143 0.895*
[0.23] [0.00] [0.530] [0.00] [0.07] [0.01] [0.44] [0.08]
L.HHIA^2 -0.134*** -1.954*** -18.085** -1.058*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.08]
L.GDPPC 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 -0.000* 0
[0.95] [0.84] [0.38] [0.28] [0.28] [0.21] [0.09] [0.13]
L.LPOP 0.106** 0.101** 1.228** 1.066* 5.923 5.155 1.009** 0.840*
[0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.06] [0.32] [0.39] [0.02] [0.06]
L.GROWTH 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.003 0.005 0.007*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.24] [0.25] [0.98] [0.96] [0.23] [0.08]
L.INFL 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0005 -0.045** -0.046** -0.002 -0.003
[0.760] [0.67] [0.38] [0.41] [0.04] [0.03] [0.19] [0.86]
L.ER -0.000* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.08] [0.11] [0.33] [0.37] [0.91] [0.89] [0.32] [0.72]
L.LASSET 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.227*** 0.225*** 1.757** 1.791** 0.214*** 0.290***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00]
L.CTI 0 0 0.001* 0.001* -0.01 -0.01 -0.001






[0.00] [0.00]  
L.NPLcox 0.401*** 0.393***
[0.00] [0.00]
Constant -0.541*** -0.540*** -14.788*** -14.417*** -38.337** -38.715** -7.127*** -7.778***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 6480 6480 6128 6128 3471 3471 3471 3615
Number of banks 2022 2022 1943 1943 1185 1185 1185 1216
M1 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
M2 (p-value) 0.58 0.53 0.80 0.76 0.15 0.21 0.44 0.48
Sargan Test 0.19 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
(p-value)
HHI max 4508 3623 4750 4368
Percentile 92 90 96 95
of HHImax
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